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Abstract
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget con-
straints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a
cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same time maximize a given valuation
function. This framework captures the budgeted version of several well known optimization
problems, and when the resources are owned by strategic agents the goal is to design truthful
and budget feasible mechanisms, i.e. elicit the true cost of the resources and ensure the pay-
ments of the mechanism do not exceed the budget. Budget feasibility introduces more chal-
lenges in mechanism design, and we study instantiations of this problem for certain classes of
submodular and XOS valuation functions. We first obtain mechanisms with an improved ap-
proximation ratio for weighted coverage valuations, a special class of submodular functions
that has already attracted attention in previous works. We then provide a general scheme
for designing randomized and deterministic polynomial time mechanisms for a class of XOS
problems. This class contains problems whose feasible set forms an independence system (a
more general structure than matroids), and some representative problems include, among
others, finding maximum weighted matchings, maximum weighted matroid members, and
maximum weighted 3D-matchings. For most of these problems, only randomized mecha-
nisms with very high approximation ratios were known prior to our results.
∗A conference version appears in WINE 2016. Research supported by an internal research funding program of the
Athens University of Economics and Business.
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1 Introduction
In this work, we study a class of mechanism design problems under a budget constraint. Con-
sider a reverse auction setting, where a single buyer wants to select a subset, among a set A of
agents, for performing some tasks. Each agent i comes at a cost ci , in the case that he is chosen.
The buyer has a budget B and a valuation function v(·), so that v(S) is the derived value if S ⊆ A is
the chosen set. The purely algorithmic version then asks to maximize the generated value subject
to the constraint that the total cost of the selected agents should not exceed B (often referred to
as a “hard” budget constraint). Some of these problems are motivated by crowdsourcing scenar-
ios and related applications, where agents can be viewed as workers, e.g., [3]. Apart from that,
they also form natural “budgeted” versions of well known optimization problems.
In the mechanism design version that we focus on, the cost ci is private information for each
agent i . Hence, we want to design mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually ra-
tional, and budget feasible, i.e. the sum of the payments to the agents does not exceed B . Note
that the payments here can be higher than the actual costs in order to induce truthfulness. Bud-
get feasibility is a tricky property that makes the problem more challenging, as it already rules
out well known mechanisms such as VCG. Although the algorithmic versions of such problems
often admit constant factor approximation algorithms, it is not clear how to appropriately con-
vert them into truthful budget feasible mechanisms. Therefore, the question of interest is to find
mechanisms that achieve the best possible approximation for the optimal value of v(·) under
these constraints. We stress that the question is nontrivial even if we allow exponential time al-
gorithms, since computational power does not necessarily make the problem easier (see also the
discussion in [12]).
Budgeted mechanism design was first studied by Singer [21] when v(·) is an additive or a
nondecreasing submodular function. Later on, follow up works have also provided more results
for XOS and subadditive functions (see the related work section). Although these results shed
more light on our understanding of the problem, there are still several interesting issues that
remain unresolved both for submodular and non-submodular cases. First, the current results on
submodular valuations are not known to be tight. Further, and most importantly, when going
beyond submodularity, to XOS functions, we are not even aware of general mechanisms with
small approximation guarantees, let alone deterministic polynomial time mechanisms.
Contribution: We first demonstrate (Section 3) how to obtain improved deterministic budget
feasible mechanisms for weighted coverage valuations, a notable subclass of submodular func-
tions. This class has already received attention in previous works [21, 22], motivated by problems
related to influence maximization in social networks. Our mechanism reduces roughly by half
(from 31.03 to 15.45) the known approximation of [22] and also generalizes it to the weighted
version of coverage functions. We then move to our main result (Section 4), which is a general
scheme for obtaining randomized and deterministic polynomial time approximations for a sub-
class of XOS problems, that contains the budgeted versions of several well known optimization
problems. We first illustrate our ideas in Section 4.1, on the budgeted matching problem, where
v(S) is defined as the maximum weight matching that can be derived from the edges of S. For
this problem only a randomized 768-approximation was known [5].Our approach yields a ran-
domized 3-approximation and a deterministic 4-approximation. Then in Section 4.2, we show
how to generalize these results to problems with a similar combinatorial structure, where the set
of feasible solutions forms an independence system. These structures are more general than ma-
troids (they do not always satisfy the exchange property) and some representative problems that
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are captured include finding maximum weighted matroid members, maximum weighted k-D-
matchings, and maximum weighted independent sets. For such problems we establish that a ρ-
approximation to the algorithmic problem can be converted into a deterministic (resp. random-
ized), truthful, budget feasible mechanism with an approximation ratio of 2ρ+2 (resp. 2ρ+1).
We conclude with some interesting open problems for future work.
Related Work: The study of budget feasible mechanisms, as considered here, was initiated by
Singer [21], who gave a randomized constant factor approximation mechanism for nondecreas-
ing submodular functions. Later, Chen et al. [9] significantly improved these approximation ra-
tios, obtaining a randomized, polynomial time mechanism achieving a 7.91-approximation and
a deterministic one with a 8.34-approximation. Their deterministic mechanism does not run
in polynomial time in general, but it can be modified to do so for special cases at the expense
of its performance (see the beginning of Section 3). As an example, Singer [22] followed a sim-
ilar approach to obtain a deterministic, polynomial time, 31.03-approximation mechanism for
the unweighted version of Budgeted Max Coverage, a class that we also consider in Section 3.
Along these lines, Horel et al. [17] consider another family of submodular functions and give
a deterministic, polynomial time, constant approximation for the so-called Experimental De-
sign Problem, under a mild relaxation on truthfulness. For subadditive functions Dobzinski et
al. [12] suggested a randomized O(log2 n)-approximation mechanism. This was later improved
to O
(
logn/loglogn
)
by Bei et al. [5], who also gave a randomized O(1)-approximation mecha-
nism for XOS functions, albeit in exponential time, and further initiated the Bayesian analysis
in this setting. Recently, there is also a line of related work under the large market assumption
(where no participant can affect significantly the market outcome). Under this assumption, Anari
et al. [3] resolved the additive case by giving a ee−1 -approximation mechanism and a matching
lower bound. Further results for large markets were obtained by Goel et al. [15] for a crowdsourc-
ing problem with matching constraints (and hence a non submodular objective).
A related line of work involves the design of frugal mechanisms. These are mechanisms where
one cares for minimizing the total amount of payments that are required by the mechanism, for
finding a good solution. A series of results has been obtained over the years on designing frugal
mechanisms, see e.g., [4, 8, 18, 19]. Frugal mechanism design is a complementary approach to
budget feasibility, since here we have a hard budget constraint that should never be exceeded.
Hence, results from this area do not generally transfer to our setting.
Finally, there is a plethora of works on auctions that take budgets into account, from the bid-
der’s point of view, motivated mainly by sponsored search auctions, see among others, [6, 11, 14]
for some representative problems that have been tackled. Although these are fundamentally dif-
ferent problems than ours, they do highlight the difficulties that arise in the presence of budget
constraints.
2 Definitions and Notation
We will use A = [n]= {1,2, ...,n} to denote a set of n agents. Each agent i is associated with a pri-
vate cost ci , denoting the cost for participating in the solution or for performing a certain task.
We consider a procurement auction setting, where the auctioneer is equipped with a valuation
function v : 2A →Q+ and a positive budget B . Here v(S), for S ⊆ A, is the value or happiness de-
rived by the auctioneer if the set S is selected. Therefore, the algorithmic goal in all the problems
we study is to select a set S that maximizes v(S) subject to the constraint
∑
i∈S ci ≤B .
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We consider valuation functions that are non-decreasing, i.e. v(S) ≤ v(T ) for any S ⊆ T ⊆ A.
Throughout our work, we will focus on valuations that come from two natural classes of func-
tions, namely submodular and XOS functions defined below.
Definition 2.1. A valuation function, defined on 2A for some set A, is
(i) submodular, if v(S∪ {i })− v(S)≥ v(T ∪ {i })− v(T ) for any S ⊂ T ⊂ A, and i 6∈ T .
(ii) XOS or fractionally subadditive, if there exist additive functions α1, ...,αr , for some finite r ,
such that v(S)=max{α1(S),α2(S), ...,αr (S)}.
We note that the class XOS is a strict superclass of submodular valuations.
Mechanism Design. Each agent here only has his cost as private information, hence we are in
the domain of single-parameter problems. A mechanismM = ( f , p) in our context consists of
an outcome rule f and a payment rule p. Given a vector of cost declarations, b = (bi )i∈A, where
bi denotes the cost reported by agent i , the mechanism selects the set f (b). At the same time, it
computes payments p(b)= (pi (b))i∈N where pi (b) denotes the payment issued to agent i .
The main properties we want to ensure for our mechanisms in this work are the following.
Definition 2.2. A mechanismM = ( f , p) is
1. truthful, if reporting ci is a dominant strategy for every agent i .
2. individually rational, if pi (b)≥ 0 for every i ∈ A, and pi (b)≥ ci , for every i ∈ f (b).
3. budget feasible, if
∑
i∈A pi (b)≤B for every b.
When referring to randomized mechanisms, the notion of truthfulness we use is universal
truthfulness, which means that the mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic
truthful mechanisms.
For single-parameter problems we use the characterization by Myerson [20] for deriving truth-
ful mechanisms. In particular, we say that an outcome rule f is monotone, if for every agent i ∈ A,
and any vector of cost declarations b, if i ∈ f (b), then i ∈ f (b′i ,b−i ) for b′i ≤ bi . This simply means
that if an agent is selected in the outcome by declaring a cost bi , then he should also be selected
if he declares a lower cost.
Lemma 2.3. Given a monotone algorithm f , there is a unique payment scheme p such that ( f , p)
is a truthful and individually rational mechanism, given by
pi (b)=
{
supbi∈[ci ,∞){bi : i ∈ f (bi ,b−i )} , if i ∈ f (b)
0 , otherwise
Lemma 2.3 is known as Myerson’s lemma, and the payments are often referred to as threshold
payments, since they indicate the threshold at which an agent stops being selected. Myerson’s
lemma simplifies the design of truthful mechanisms by focusing only on constructing monotone
algorithms and not having to worry about the payment scheme. Nevertheless, in the setting we
study here budget feasibility clearly complicates things further. For all the algorithms presented
in the next sections, we always assume that the underlying payment scheme is given by Myerson’s
lemma.
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3 Deterministic Mechanisms for Submodular Objectives
We begin our exposition with submodular valuations, and show in Section 3.1 how to obtain an
improved approximation for a subclass of such functions. To do this, we exploit the approach by
Chen et al. [9], starting with their mechanism, shown below:
MECHANISM-SM(A, v,c,B) [9]
1 Set A = {i | ci ≤B} and i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈A v(i )
2 if 1+4e+
p
1+24e2
2(e−1) · v(i∗)≥OPT(A {i∗}, v,c−i∗ ,B) then
3 return i∗
4 else
5 return GREEDY-SM(A, v,c,B/2)
In MECHANISM-SM, an agent i∗ of maximum value is compared with an optimal solution
at the instance A {i∗} with budget B . Then, either i∗ or GREEDY-SM(A, v,c,B/2) is returned.
GREEDY-SM is a greedy algorithm that picks agents according to their ratio of marginal value
over cost, given that this cost is not too large. For the sake of presentation, we assume the agents
are sorted in descending order with respect to this ratio. The marginal value of each agent is
calculated with respect to the previous agents in the ordering, i.e. 1 = argmax j∈A v( j )c j and i =
argmax j∈A\[i−1]
v([ j ])−v([ j−1])
c j
for i ≥ 2.
GREEDY-SM(A, v,c,B/2) [9]
1 Let k = 1 and S =;
2 while k ≤ |A| and ck ≤ B2 · v(S∪{k})−v(S)v(S∪{k}) do
3 S = S∪ {k}
4 k = k+1
5 return S
For simplicity, we drop the valuation function and the cost vector from the arguments, e.g.,
we write GREEDY-SM(A,B/2) instead of GREEDY-SM(A, v,c,B/2). From the work of Chen et al. [9]
the following lemma is inferred.
Lemma 3.1. GREEDY-SM(A,B/2) is monotone and outputs a set S such that v(S)≥ e−13e ·OPT(A,B)−
2
3 · v(i∗). Using the threshold payments of Myerson’s lemma, the mechanism is truthful, individu-
ally rational, and budget feasible.
MECHANISM-SM is deterministic and by using Lemma 3.1, it can be shown that it achieves
an approximation factor of 8.34 for any nondecreasing submodular objective. However, it is not
guaranteed to run in polynomial time, since we need to compute OPT(A {i∗},B), and more often
than not, submodular maximization problems turn out to be NP-hard. An obvious question here
is whether we can use an approximate solution instead, but it is not hard to see that by doing
so we might sacrifice truthfulness. As a way out, Chen et al. [9] mention that instead of OPT(A
{i∗},B), an optimal solution to a fractional relaxation of the problem can be used.1 Although this
1Intuitively, this would maintain truthfulness because no losing agent can force the mechanism to run GREEDY-
SM without lowering his bid below his current cost. This is due to the fact that OPT f is nonincreasing with respect
to the bid of each agent.
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does not always make the mechanism run in polynomial time, it helps in some cases.
Suppose that for a specific submodular objective, the budgeted maximization problem can
be expressed as an ILP, the corresponding LP relaxation of which can be solved in polynomial
time. Further, suppose that for any instance I and any budget B , the optimal fractional solution
OPT f (I ,B) is within a constant factor of the optimal integral solution OPT(I ,B). Then replacing
OPT(A {i∗},B) by OPT f (A {i∗},B) in MECHANISM-SM still gives a truthful, constant approx-
imation. In fact, we give a variant of MECHANISM-SM below, where the constants have been
appropriately tuned, so as to optimize the achieved approximation ratio.
Specifically, suppose that the valuation function is such that OPT f (I ,B) ≤ ρ ·OPT(I ,B), for
any I and any B . Let γ=√1+4(ρ−1)e+4(ρ2+4ρ+1)e2 and α= 1+2(ρ+1)e+γ2(e−1) .
MECHANISM-SM-FRAC(A, v,c,B)
1 Set A = {i | ci ≤B} and i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈A v(i )
2 if α · v(i∗)≥OPT f (A {i∗}, v,c−i∗ ,B) then
3 return i∗
4 else
5 return GREEDY-SM(A, v,c,B/2)
Theorem 3.2. MECHANISM-SM-FRAC is truthful, individually rational, and budget feasible with
approximation ratio 2(ρ+2)e−1+γ2(e−1) , where ρ and γ are as above. Moreover, it is deterministic and runs
in polynomial time given a polynomial time exact algorithm for computing OPT f (A {i
∗},B).
The proof of Theorem 3.2 follows closely the corresponding result for MECHANISM-SM [9],
but we include it here for completeness.
Proof. For truthfulness and individual rationality, it suffices to show that the allocation rule is
monotone, i.e. a winning agent j remains a winner if he decreases his cost to c ′j < c j . If j = i∗
then clearly his bid is irrelevant and he remains a winner. If j 6= i∗ and he was a winner, then by
reducing the cost to c ′j , the mechanism will still execute GREEDY-SM, because OPT f (A {i
∗},B) is
higher than before. Hence j remains a winner due to the monotonicity of GREEDY-SM (Lemma
3.1). This argument also highlights why we cannot in general use an arbitrary approximation
algorithm instead of OPT f (A {i
∗},B), since we cannot predict how the solution is affected when
the cost changes from c j to c ′j .
Regarding budget feasibility, under the threshold payment scheme of Lemma 2.3, we either
have to pay agent i∗ the whole budget, or pay the winners of GREEDY-SM(A,B/2) the maximum
bid that guarantees them to win in MECHANISM-SM. We stress that in the latter case, the pay-
ments are upper bounded by the payments induced by running GREEDY-SM(A,B/2) alone. This
holds because OPT f (A {i
∗},B) is decreasing in the cost of each agent, and so line 2 imposes an
extra upper bound on the cost that each agent can report and still be a winner. Hence, budget
feasibility follows from the budget feasibility of GREEDY-SM(A,B/2) (Lemma 3.1).
Finally, for the approximation ratio we consider two cases. If the mechanism returns i∗, then
α · v(i∗)≥OPT f (A {i∗},B)≥OPT(A {i∗},B)≥OPT(A,B)− v(i∗) ,
and therefore OPT(A,B)≤ (α+1) · v(i∗)= 2(ρ+2)e−1+γ2(e−1) · v(i∗).
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On the other hand, if GREEDY-SM(A,B/2) is executed, and S is the set of agents returned,
then
α · v(i∗)<OPT f (A {i∗},B)≤ ρ ·OPT(A {i∗},B)≤ ρ ·OPT(A,B) . (1)
Combining (1) with the approximation from Lemma 3.1 we have
OPT(A,B)≤ e
e−1
(
3v(S)+2v(i∗))< e
e−1
(
3v(S)+ 2ρ
α
OPT(A,B)
)
,
and therefore OPT(A,B) ≤ 3αe
α(e−1)−2ρe · v(S) =
2(ρ+2)e−1+γ
2(e−1) · v(S), where the last equality is just a
matter of calculations.
Therefore, in both cases, the output of the mechanism is a 2(ρ+2)e−1+γ2(e−1) -approximation of
OPT(A,B).
3.1 Budgeted Max Weighted Coverage
We consider the class of weighted coverage valuations, a special class of submodular functions.
Their unweighted version was studied by Singer in [21] and [22], motivated by the problem of
influence maximization over social networks. Imagine a company that tries to promote a new
product and as part of its marketing campaign decides to advertise (or even sell at a promotional
price) the product to selected influential nodes. Suppose that each node i , is able to influence
some set of other nodes, but this comes at a cost ci (cost of advertising and convincing i ). Then,
if there is a budget available for the campaign, the goal would be to select a set of initial nodes
respecting the budget, so as to maximize the (weighted) union of people who are eventually in-
fluenced. This gives rise to the following problem.
Budgeted Max Weighted Coverage. Given a set of subsets {Si | i ∈ [m]} of a ground set [n], along
with costs c1,c2, ...,cm , on the subsets, weights w1, ..., wn , on the ground elements, and a positive
budget B , find X ⊆ [m] so that v(X )=∑ j∈⋃i∈X Si w j is maximized subject to∑i∈X ci ≤B .
In the definition above, Si is the set of people that agent i can influence. On a different note,
the problem can also be thought of as a crowd-sourcing problem, where each (single-minded)
worker i is able to execute only the set of tasks Si .
In [22], Singer takes an approach similar to what led to MECHANISM-SM-FRAC, but suggests a
different polynomial time mechanism for Budgeted Max Coverage that is deterministic, truthful,
budget feasible, and achieves approximation ratio 31.03. Here we generalize and improve this
result by showing that there is a deterministic, truthful, budget feasible, polynomial time 15.45-
approximate mechanism for the Budgeted Weighted Max Coverage problem.
For all j ∈ [n] define T j = {i | j ∈ Si }. We begin with a LP formulation of this problem, where
without loss of generality we assume that ci ≤ B ,∀i ∈ [n] (otherwise we could just discard any
subsets with cost greater than B).
maximize:
∑
j∈[n]
w j z j (2)
subject to:
∑
i∈T j
xi ≥ z j , ∀ j ∈ [n] (3)∑
i∈[m]
ci xi ≤B (4)
0≤ xi , z j ≤ 1 , ∀i ∈ [m], ∀ j ∈ [n] (5)
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xi ∈ {0,1} , ∀i ∈ [m] (6)
It is not hard to see that (2)-(6) is a natural ILP formulation for Budgeted Max Weighted Cover-
age and (2)-(5) is its linear relaxation. For the rest of this subsection, let OPT(I ,B) and OPT f (I ,B)
denote the optimal solutions to (2)-(6) and (2)-(5) respectively for instance I and budget B .
To show how these two are related we will use the technique of pipage rounding [1, 2]. Al-
though we do not provide a description of the general pipage rounding technique, the proof of
Lemma 3.3 below is self-contained. We should note here that Ageev and Sviridenko [2] use the
above linear programs (as well as the nonlinear program in the proof of Lemma 3.3) to obtain
an ee−1 -approximation LP-based algorithm that uses pipage rounding on a number of different
instances of the problem.2 However, in their algorithm OPT(I ,B) is never compared directly to
OPT f (I ,B), and therefore we cannot get the desired bound from there.
Lemma 3.3. Given the fractional relaxation (2)-(5) for Budgeted Max Weighted Coverage, we have
that for any instance I and any budget B
OPT f (I ,B)≤
2e
e−1 ·OPT(I ,B) .
Proof. Given any feasible solution x, z to (2)-(5), the value of (2) is upper bounded by L(x) =∑
j∈[n] w j ·min{1,
∑
i∈T j xi }, since z j ≤min{1,
∑
i∈T j xi } for any j ∈ [n]. In particular, if x∗, z∗ is an
optimal (fractional) solution to (2)-(5), then the value of (2) is exactly L(x∗)=OPT f (I ,B).
Next we consider the nonlinear program
maximize: F (x)= ∑
j∈[n]
w j
(
1− ∏
i∈T j
(1−xi )
)
(7)
subject to:
∑
i∈[m]
ci xi ≤B (8)
0≤ xi ≤ 1 ,∀i ∈ [m] (9)
and we observe that F (x)≥ (1−1/e)L(x) for any feasible vector x. This follows from the fact that
(1− (1− 1/k)k ) ≥ (1− 1/e) for any k ≥ 1, and the following inequality, derived in Goemans and
Williamson [16] (Lemma 3.1 in their work):
1− ∏
i∈[k]
(1− yi )≥ (1− (1−1/k)k )min
{
1,
∑
i∈[k]
yi
}
.
So, if x∗, z∗ is an optimal solution to (2)-(5) we have
F (x∗)≥ (1−1/e)L(x∗)= (1−1/e)OPT f (I ,B) .
However, x∗ may have several fractional coordinates. Our next step is to transform x∗ to a
vector x ′ that has at most one fractional coordinate and at the same time F (x ′) ≥ F (x∗). To this
end, we show how to reduce the fractional coordinates by (at least) one in any feasible vector
with at least two such coordinates.
Consider a feasible vector x, and suppose xi and x j are two non integral coordinates. Let
xi , jε be the vector we get if we replace xi by xi + ε and x j by x j − εci /c j and leave every other
2In fact, Ageev and Sviridenko [2] study the hitting set version of this problem, but both problems have essentially
the same linear program formulation.
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coordinate of x the same. Note that the function F¯ (ε)= F (xi , jε ), with respect to ε, is either linear
or a polynomial of degree 2 with positive leading coefficient. That is, F¯ (ε) is convex.
Notice now that xi , jε always satisfies the budget constraint (8), and also satisfies (9) as long
as ε ∈ [max{−xi , (x j −1)c j /ci } ,min{1−xi , x j c j /ci }]. Due to convexity, F¯ (ε) attains a maximum
on one of the endpoints of this interval, say at ε∗. Moreover, at either endpoint at least one of
xi +ε∗ and x j −ε∗ci /c j is integral. That is, xi , jε∗ has at least one more integral coordinate than x
and F (xi , jε∗ )≥ F (x).
Hence, initially x ← x∗. As long as there exist two non integral coordinates xi and x j we set
x ← xi , jε∗ as described above. This procedure runs for at most n − 1 iterations, and outputs a
feasible vector x ′ that is integral or almost integral and F (x ′)≥ F (x∗).
At this point we should note that when all the xi s are integral then the objectives (2) and (7)
have the same value if we set z j = min{1,∑i∈T j xi } for all j ∈ [n]. Specifically, if x is any feasible
integral vector, we have F (x)≤OPT(I ,B). So, if x ′ is integral then
OPT f (I ,B)= L(x∗)≤
e
e−1 ·F (x
∗)≤ e
e−1 ·F (x
′)≤ e
e−1 ·OPT(I ,B) ,
and we are done. Thus, suppose that x ′ has exactly one fractional coordinate, say xr . Let xi be
the vector we get if we set xr to i ∈ {0,1} and leave every other coordinate of x ′ the same. Note that
x1− x0 corresponds to the vector that has 1 in the r th coordinate and 0 everywhere else. Clearly,
OPT(I ,B) ≥ max{F (x0),F (x1−x0)} (where x1 − x0 is feasible since we have discarded subsets
with ci > B). Moreover, F on integral vectors is submodular, and hence subadditive, therefore
F (x1)−F (x0)≤ F (x1− x0). Finally, it is easy to see that F is increasing with respect to any single
coordinate, so F (x1)≥ F (x ′). Combining all the above we get
OPT f (I ,B)= L(x∗)≤
e
e−1 ·F (x
∗)≤ e
e−1 ·F (x
′)≤ e
e−1 ·F (x
1)
≤ e
e−1 ·
(
F (x0)+F (x1−x0))≤ 2e
e−1 ·OPT(I ,B) ,
thus completing the proof.
Combining Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 we get the following result.
Corollary 3.4. There exists a deterministic, truthful, individually rational, budget feasible 15.45-
approximate mechanism for Budgeted Max Weighted Coverage that runs in polynomial time.
4 Going Beyond Submodularity
Going beyond submodular valuations seems even more challenging. The first attempt to design
a truthful mechanism for a budgeted maximization problem with a non-submodular objective
was due to Chen et al. [9] who gave a (2+p2)-approximation mechanism for a non-submodular
variation of Knapsack. For the more general class of subadditive functions Dobzinski et al. [12]
suggested a randomized O(log2 n)-approximation mechanism, and later, Bei et al. [5] provided
randomized, truthful, budget feasible mechanisms with approximation ratio 768 for XOS objec-
tives and O
( logn
loglogn
)
for subadditive objectives.
More recently, Goel et al. [15] study a budgeted maximization problem with matching con-
straints, which is not submodular, and they achieve an approximation ratio of 3+ o(1) with a
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deterministic mechanism, but under the large market assumption3 (their mechanism has an un-
bounded ratio in general). Essentially, they use the same greedy approach with Singer [21] and
Chen et al. [9] but seen as a descending price auction. A very similar mechanism was also briefly
discussed in Anari et al. [3] for Knapsack under the large market assumption.
We are building on this idea of gradually decreasing a global upper bound on the payment
per value ratio to get all the results of this section. We first use Budgeted Max Weighted Matching
in Subsection 4.1, as an illustrative example of how this approach works, but the exact same
approach gives the same approximation guarantees for a number of different XOS problems that
can be seen as appropriately restricted generalizations of Knapsack. We elaborate further on this
in Subsection 4.2, and we even extend these ideas to problems where the unbudgeted versions
are not easy.
4.1 Budgeted Max Weighted Matching
We revisit the following budgeted matching problem.
Budgeted Max Weighted Matching. Given a budget B , and a graph G = (V ,E), where each edge
ei ∈ E has a cost ci and a value vi , find a matching M of maximum value subject to∑i∈M ci ≤B .
Here we study the mechanism design version of the problem, where the values are known to
the mechanism and the edges are viewed as single-parameter strategic agents whose cost is pri-
vate information.4 Note that in order to formulate the problem to fit the general description given
in the beginning of Section 2, we can define the valuation function as follows (as also mentioned
in [5]): for any subset of edges S ⊆ E , v(S) is taken to be the value of the maximum weighted
matching of G that only uses edges in S. This function turns out to be XOS, but not submodular
(see the next proposition). Hence, by [5], there exists a randomized, 768-approximation, that is
truthful and budget feasible.
Proposition 4.1. The function v(·) defined above is XOS, but not submodular.
Proof. To prove that v(·) is not submodular, we may consider the following example:
1 
1 1 
1 
1 
u1 v1 
u2 v2 
u1 v1 
v2 u2 
Let A = {u2v1}, B = {u2v1,u2v2} and add the dashed edge u1v1 to both sets. Then we have that
v(A∪ {u1v1})− v(A)= 1−1= 0< 1= 2−1= v(B ∪ {u1v1})− v(B).
Now to prove that v(·) is XOS, let {M1, M2, ..., Mr } be the finite set of all possible matchings of
a given graph G , and set α j (S) = ∑i∈S∩M j vi , for j ∈ {1, ...,r }, S ⊆ E(G). Note that each α j is an
additive function. Indeed, α j (S) =∑i∈S v j ,i , where v j ,i is equal to vi if i ∈ M j and 0 otherwise.
3A market is said to be large if the number of participants is large enough that no single person can affect signifi-
cantly the market outcome, i.e. maxi ci /B = o(1).
4The work of Singer [21] also studies a type of a budgeted matching problem. That objective, however, is OXS (a
subclass of submodular objectives), and differs significantly from ours, which is not submodular [23].
10
Since v(S) is defined to be the value of the maximum weighted matching of G that only uses
edges in S, we have that v(S)=max{α1(S),α2(S), ...,αr (S)}.
We provide both deterministic and randomized polynomial time mechanisms with a much
improved approximation ratio, based on selecting an outcome among two candidate solutions.
The first solution comes from the greedy mechanism GREEDY-ISK described below. The main
idea behind the mechanism is that in each iteration there is an implicit common upper bound on
the rate that determines the payment of each winner in the candidate outcome of that iteration.
More specifically, if the i th iteration is the final iteration (i.e. the condition in line 5 is true), the
common payment per value for each of the winners is upper bounded by min{B/v(M),ci−1/vi−1}.
This upper bound decreases with each iteration, while the set of active agents is shrinking, un-
til budget feasibility is achieved. At the same time we ensure the mechanism is monotone and
returns enough value.
We assume that the mechanism also takes as input a deterministic exact algorithm f for the
unbudgeted Max Weighted Matching, e.g., Edmond’s algorithm [13]. Later, in Subsection 4.2 the
choice of f will depend on the underlying unbudgeted problem. Finally, note that our mech-
anisms are named after the generalization we study in Subsection 4.2, namely Independence
System Knapsack problems.
GREEDY-ISK(A, v,c,B , f )
1 Set A = {i | ci ≤B}
2 Possibly rename elements of A so that c1v1 ≥
c2
v2
≥ ...≥ cmvm
3 for i = 1 to m do
4 M = f (A, v)
5 if v(M) · civi ≤B then
6 return M
7 else
8 A = A {i }
We now exhibit some desirable properties of GREEDY-ISK, starting with truthfulness.
Lemma 4.2. Mechanism GREEDY-ISK is monotone, and hence truthful and individually rational.
Proof. By Lemma 2.3, we just need to show that the allocation rule is monotone, i.e. a winning
agent remains a winner if he decreases his cost. Initially note that in line 4 the mechanism com-
putes an optimal matching M (without a budget constraint) using only the values of the edges,
thus it cannot be manipulated given the set of active edges A.
Fix a vector c− j for the costs of the other agents, and suppose that when agent j declares c j , he
is in the matching M returned in the final iteration, say k, of GREEDY-ISK. Let agent j now report
c ′j < c j to the mechanism. This makes him agent j ′ ≥ j in the new instance, but does not affect
the relative ordering of the other agents (although a few of them may move down one position).
Therefore, GREEDY-ISK will run exactly as before for each iteration i < k and in the beginning of
the kth iteration, it will produce the exact same matching M . Then in line 5, there are 2 cases to
examine. If in the initial instance j > k, then we have the exact same ratio ckvk to consider, and the
algorithm will terminate with M (since it did so in the initial instance). In the second case, j = k
in the initial instance. This means that now at the kth iteration, we either have the same agent
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with the reduced ratio
c ′k
vk
(since now c ′k = c ′j ) or we have the agent who was in position k+1 in the
initial instance with ratio equal to the original ck+1vk+1 . Therefore, the new ratio
ck
vk
that the algorithm
considers in this iteration is at most equal to the original ratio ckvk . Thus, the condition in line 5 is
satisfied, and the mechanism will return M . We conclude that an agent who is in the matching,
remains in the matching by decreasing his cost.
We also make the following remark, which can be derived by the same arguments used in the
proof of Lemma 4.2. This property is crucial for derandomizing our mechanisms both here and
in the next subsection.
Remark 4.3. There is no agent i that can manipulate the output set of GREEDY-ISK given that i
is guaranteed to be a winner. That is, fix c−i and let M and M ′ be the winning sets when i bids ci
and c ′i respectively; if i ∈M ∩M ′, then M =M ′.
We move on to prove that the mechanism will never exceed the budget B , by establishing an
appropriate upper bound on every winning bid.
Lemma 4.4. Mechanism GREEDY-ISK is budget feasible.
Proof. We will show that the threshold payment of Lemma 2.3 cannot be higher than vi Bv(M) for any
winning agent i . Fix a vector c−i for all agents other than i and recall that the threshold payment,
given c−i , is the maximum cost that i can declare and still be included in the solution. So, towards
a contradiction, suppose that agent i declares a cost ci > vi Bv(M) and he is a winner. Let j denote
the iteration where the mechanism GREEDY-ISK terminates and the matching M is returned. By
the construction of the mechanism, and since i ∈ M , we have that c jv j ≥
ci
vi
. Since j is the last
iteration, we also have by line 5 that v(M)
c j
v j
≤ B . Hence v(M) civi ≤ v(M)
c j
v j
≤ B that leads to the
contradiction ci ≤ vi Bv(M) . Therefore, the payment of each winning agent i is bounded by vi Bv(M) , and
the total payment of the mechanism is
∑
i∈M pi ≤
∑
i∈M
vi B
v(M) =B .
Finally, we analyze the quality of the solution produced by the greedy mechanism.
Lemma 4.5. Mechanism GREEDY-ISK produces a matching with value at least 12 (v(M
∗)− vi∗),
where M∗ is an optimal solution to the given instance of Budgeted Max Weighted Matching, and
i∗ has maximum value among the budget feasible edges of G, i.e. i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈F v(i ) where F =
{i ∈ E(G) | ci ≤B}.
Proof. Let M∗ be an optimal budget feasible matching and A be the set of active edges at the final
iteration j of GREEDY-ISK when matching M was returned. We have that v(M∗) = v(M∗∩ A)+
v(M∗ A). Since M∗∩ A is a matching with edges from A but M is an optimal such matching, we
have that
v(M∗∩ A)≤ v(M) . (10)
In addition, notice that if i ∈M∗ A then civi ≥
c j−1
v j−1 since j −1 is the last edge removed from the set
A before the final iteration j . Thus,
B ≥ ∑
i∈M∗ A
ci ≥
∑
i∈M∗ A
vi ·
c j−1
v j−1
≥ v(M∗ A) · c j−1
v j−1
. (11)
Now, consider the ( j−1)th iteration and call M ′ the matching produced in that iteration. Note
that M ′ { j −1} is a matching containing only edges that are active during iteration j . Therefore,
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v(M)≥ v(M ′ { j −1}). Moreover, if j −1 ∈M ′ then v(M ′)= v(M ′ { j −1})+v j−1, while if j −1 ∉M ′
then v(M ′)= v(M ′ { j −1})≤ v(M ′ { j −1})+ v j−1. Using also the fact that j −1 was not the final
iteration we have
v j−1
c j−1
·B < v(M ′)≤ v(M ′ { j −1})+ v j−1 ≤ v(M)+ vi∗ . (12)
By combining (11) and (12) we get
v(M∗ A)≤ v(M)+ vi∗ . (13)
Finally, combining (13) with (10) we get v(M∗) = v(M∗∩ A)+ v(M∗ A) ≤ v(M)+ v(M)+ vi∗ =
2v(M)+ vi∗ and therefore v(M)≥ 12 (v(M∗)− vi∗).
We can now state our randomized mechanism for the problem (where the constants below have
been optimized to get the best ratio).
RAND-ISK
1 Set A = {i | ci ≤B} and i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈A v(i )
2 With probability 1/3 return i∗ and with probability 2/3 return GREEDY-ISK(A, v,c,B , f )
Theorem 4.6. RAND-ISK is a universally truthful, individually rational, budget feasible, polyno-
mial time randomized mechanism, achieving a 3-approximation in expectation, for the Budgeted
Max Weighted Matching problem.
Proof. Universal truthfulness and individual rationality follow from Lemma 4.2 and the fact that
the simple mechanism that returns i∗ and pays him B is truthful and individually rational. Re-
garding budget feasibility, just notice that if i∗ is returned then the threshold payment is exactly
B , otherwise the payments of GREEDY-ISK are used, so budget feasibility follows from Lemma
4.4. Finally, if M denotes the outcome of RAND-ISK, then directly by Lemma 4.5 we have
E(M)≥ 2
3
· 1
2
(v(M∗)− vi∗)+ 1
3
vi∗ = 1
3
v(M∗) ,
thus proving the approximation ratio.
Derandomization. We close this subsection by providing a deterministic polynomial time mech-
anism with a slightly worse approximation ratio. It is interesting to note that in contrast to
MECHANISM-SM or MECHANISM-SM-FRAC, here i∗ is directly compared to its alternative, which
is just an approximate solution, without sacrificing truthfulness. This is due to Remark 4.3. Note
also that although taking the maximum of two truthful algorithms does not always yield a truthful
mechanism, we show this is the case for the mechanism below.
DET-ISK
1 Set A = {i | ci ≤B} and i∗ ∈ argmaxi∈A v(i )
2 if vi∗ ≥GREEDY-ISK(A {i∗}, v,c−i∗ ,B , f ) then
3 return i∗
4 else
5 return GREEDY-ISK(A {i∗}, v,c−i∗ ,B , f )
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Theorem 4.7. DET-ISK is a truthful, individually rational, budget feasible, polynomial time deter-
ministic mechanism, achieving a 4-approximation ratio for the Budgeted Max Weighted Matching
problem.
Proof. For truthfulness and individual rationality we show the algorithm is monotone. If i∗ wins
(lines 2-3) and he decreases his cost, he still wins since his bid is irrelevant to the outcome. On
the other hand, suppose that the mechanism reaches line 5 and let i ∈ A {i∗} be one of the
winners. Then, by decreasing his cost, i will remain a winner since the output of GREEDY-ISK
will not change (see the proof of Lemma 4.2 and Remark 4.3 after that), and the same branch of
the mechanism DET-ISK will be executed again.
Budget feasibility is straightforward and follows from the same arguments used in the proof
of Theorem 4.6
For the approximation ratio, we begin with some notation. Let vG be the value of the match-
ing returned by GREEDY-ISK(A {i∗}, v,c−i∗ ,B , f ), M be the output of DET-ISK(A, v,c,B , f ), OPT(S)
be the value of an optimal solution with respect to the set of edges S ⊆ E(G), and finally let i ′ be
an edge of maximum value in the set A {i∗}. Clearly, if OPT is the value of an optimal solution
to the initial instance, then OPT = OPT(A). Finally, observe that OPT(A) ≤ OPT(A {i∗})+ vi∗ ≤
2vG+vi ′+vi∗ ≤ 2vG+2vi∗ . Now if vi∗ ≥ vG then OPT≤ 4vi∗ = 4v(M), while if vi∗ < vG then OPT≤
4vG = 4v(M). Thus in any case we have that OPT≤ 4v(M) and this concludes the proof.
The analysis of DET-ISK is tight, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.8. There exist instances where the value of the optimal solution is arbitrarily close
to four times the value of the output of DET-ISK.
Proof. We provide an example where the value achieved by DET-ISK, is almost 1/4 of the value
of an optimal solution. Consider the following graph G = (V ,E), where v1 = v +2², v2 = v , v3 = v ,
v4 = v +², for ²> 0, c1 = δ, c2 = 10, c3 = 10, c4 = δ for δ< 5²v << 10, and B = 20+2δ.
 edge 1 
edge 2 
edge 3 
edge 4 
v+2ε, δ 
v, 10 
v, 10 
v+ε, δ 
It is easy to check that E is budget feasible, and thus E is the optimal solution with value equal
to 4v + 3² = OPT. Now let us examine the value of DET-ISK’s output. The most valuable edge
here is edge 1 with v1 = v +2², so i∗ = 1. On the other hand, GREEDY-ISK orders the remaining
edges in the following manner: c2v2 ≥
c3
v3
≥ c4v4 . So by running this instance we have that (3v+²)
10
v =
30+ 10²v > 20+ 2·5²v > 20+ 2δ = B , and thus edge 2 is excluded. GREEDY-ISK then moves to the
next iteration (edges 3 and 4 are active), where (2v + ²) 10v = 20+ 10²v = 20+ 2·5²v > 20+2δ = B , so
edge 3 is excluded as well. GREEDY-ISK moves to the next iteration (only edge 4 is active), where
(v +²) δv+² = δ≤ 20+2δ=B , so the output is edge 4 with total value v +².
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Now we have that vi∗ = v +2²> v + ²= GREEDY-ISK(U {i∗},B) and hence the value of DET-
ISK’s output is v +2²' 14 (4v +3²)= 14 OPT.
Remark 4.9. Chen et al. [9] prove lower bounds for Knapsack, namely there is no deterministic
(resp. randomized) truthful, budget feasible mechanism for Knapsack that achieves an approx-
imation ratio better than 1+p2 (resp. 2). These lower bounds hold here as well, because when
the given graph G is a matching to begin with, Budgeted Max Weighted Matching reduces to
Knapsack.
4.2 A Generalization to Other Objectives
Our approach can tackle a number of different problems that have certain structural similari-
ties with Budgeted Max Weighted Matching. Here, we define a class of such problems for which
GREEDY-ISK—given an appropriate subroutine f —produces truthful, individually rational, bud-
get feasible mechanisms with good approximation guarantees.
Two crucial properties of the matching problem were used in the previous subsection: (i)
every subset of a matching is itself a matching, and (ii) the objective function becomes additive
when restricted to matchings. These two properties is all we need, and note that (i) and (ii) are
exactly what makes the set of matchings of a graph an independence system.
Definition 4.10. An independence system is a pair (U , I ), where U is an arbitrary finite set and
I ⊆ 2U is a family of subsets, whose members are called the independent sets of U and satisfy:
(i) ;∈ I
(ii) If B ∈ I and A ⊆B, then A ∈ I .
Below we define a variant of Knapsack where the feasible solutions are constrained to an in-
dependence system. This forms a generalization of knapsack problems subject to matroid con-
straints, which are more common in the literature.
Independence System Knapsack. Given an independence system (U , I ) with costs ci and values
vi on the elements of U , as well as a budget B , find M ∈ I that maximizes ∑i∈M vi subject to∑
i∈M ci ≤B .
Note that for plain Knapsack U = [n], I = 2[n], while for Budgeted Max Weighted Matching U
is the set of edges of a given graph G and I is the set of all matchings of G . There exist several
other problems that are special cases of Independence System Knapsack, like
• Budgeted Max Weighted Forest where U is the set of edges of a given graph G and I is the
set of acyclic subgraphs of G ,
• Budgeted Max Weighted Matroid Member where (U , I ) is a matroid5 (Budgeted Max Weighted
Forest is a special case of this problem),
• Budgeted Max Independent Set where U is the set of vertices of a given graph G and I is the
set of independence sets of G , and
5A matroid (U , I ) is an independence system that also has the exchange property: If A,B ∈ I and |A| < |B |, then
there exists x ∈B A such that A∪ {x} ∈ I .
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• Budgeted Max Weighted k-D-Matching where U is the set of hyperedges of a k-uniform
k-partite hypergraph H and I is the set of all k-dimensional matchings of H .
The following can be easily derived as in the case of Budgeted Max Weighted Matching.
Proposition 4.11. Every problem that can be formulated as an Independence System Knapsack
problem belongs to the class XOS.
Clearly it is not always possible to find an optimal solution to Independence System Knap-
sack in polynomial time, even if we remove the budget constraint. Putting the running time
aside, however, GREEDY-ISK combined with an exact algorithm f for the problem makes RAND-
ISK (resp. DET-ISK) a 3-approximate randomized (resp. 4-approximate deterministic) truthful,
individually rational, budget feasible mechanism.
Moreover, when the unbudgeted underlying problem is easy—as is the case for Max Weighted
Matching, Max Weighted Forest, and Max Weighted Matroid Member—the mechanisms run in
polynomial time. Even if the unbudgeted underlying problem is N P-hard, as long as there is a
polynomial time ρ(n)-approximation we get O(ρ(n))-approximate, truthful, individually ratio-
nal, budget feasible mechanisms, e.g., for Budgeted Max Weighted k-D-Matching this translates
to a O(k)-approximation mechanism. Here, n is the size of the input, and we should mention
that the independent sets of U may not be explicitly given. Typically we assume an independence
oracle that decides for any X ⊆U whether X ∈ I . However, note that in most of the cases of In-
dependence System Knapsack mentioned above (with the exception of Budgeted Max Weighted
Matroid Member) we are given a combinatorial, succinct representation of I and therefore there
is no need to assume access to an oracle.
When using a ρ(n)-approximation algorithm we should adjust the probabilities in RAND-ISK,
namely we should use 2ρ(n)2ρ(n)+1 instead of 2/3 and
1
2ρ(n)+1 instead of 1/3. Moreover, for both mech-
anisms and without loss of generality, we assume that for every i ∈U we have {i } ∈ I , or else i can
be excluded from the initial set A of active elements that is given as input to the mechanisms.
Theorem 4.12. If a deterministic ρ(n)-approximation algorithm f for the unbudgeted version of
Independence System Knapsack is given as an auxiliary input to GREEDY-ISK, then RAND-ISK
(resp. DET-ISK) becomes a (2ρ(n)+1)-approximate randomized (resp. (2ρ(n)+2)-approximate
deterministic) truthful, individually rational, budget feasible mechanism. Moreover, if f runs in
polynomial time so do the mechanisms.
The proof of Theorem 4.12 follows closely the analysis of subsection 4.1, so we only give a
sketch highlighting the differences.
Proof sketch. The proof of truthfulness, individual rationality, and budget feasibility is exactly
the same with the proofs of Lemmata 4.2 and 4.4, if we replace “matching” with “independent
set of I ” and “edge” with “element of U ”. The proof of the approximation ratios follows closely
the proofs of Lemma 4.5 and Theorems 4.6 and 4.7, so we will only focus on the differences.
Let M∗ ∈ I be an optimal budget feasible independent set and A ⊆ U be the set of active
elements at the final iteration j of GREEDY-ISK when the ρ(n)-approximate solution M was re-
turned. Also, let MA be an optimal budget feasible independent set using only elements of A. We
have that v(M∗)= v(M∗∩ A)+ v(M∗ A). But M∗∩ A ⊆M∗ is an independent set with elements
from A so, the analog of (10) is now
v(M∗∩ A)≤ v(MA)≤ ρ(n) · v(M) .
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Similarly, the analog of (13) is now
v(M∗ A)≤ ρ(n) · v(M)+ vi∗ ,
and thus we get v(M∗) = v(M∗ ∩ A)+ v(M∗ A) ≤ 2ρ(n) · v(M)+ vi∗ , or equivalently v(M) ≥
1
2ρ(n) (v(M
∗)− vi∗). Now the approximation ratio of RAND-ISK is straightforward since the ex-
pected value of the output of the mechanism is at least
2ρ(n)
2ρ(n)+1 ·
1
2ρ(n)
(v(M∗)− vi∗)+ 1
2ρ(n)+1 vi∗ =
1
2ρ(n)+1 v(M
∗) .
For the approximation ratio of DET-ISK, using the notation of the proof of Theorem 4.7 we have
OPT(A)≤OPT(A {i∗})+ vi∗ ≤ 2ρ(n)vG + vi ′ + vi∗ ≤ 2ρ(n)vG +2vi∗ .
If vi∗ ≥ vG then OPT≤ (2ρ(n)+2)vi∗ , while if vi∗ < vG then OPT≤ (2ρ(n)+2)vG . Thus in any
case we have OPT≤ (2ρ(n)+2)v(M).
Combining Theorem 4.12 with the polynomial time (k−1)-approximation algorithm of Chan
and Lau [7] for Max Weighted k-D-Matching, and the fact that Max Weighted Forest and Max
Weighted Matroid Member (given a polynomial time independence oracle) can be solved in poly-
nomial time (see, e.g., [10]), we get the following corollary.
Corollary 4.13. We can obtain
(i) randomized 3-approximation mechanisms and deterministic 4-approximation mechanisms
for Budgeted Max Weighted Forest and Budgeted Max Weighted Matroid Member (as well as Knap-
sack and Budgeted Max Weighted Matching) that run in polynomial time.
(ii) randomized 3-approximation mechanisms and deterministic 4-approximation mechanisms
for Budgeted Max Weighted Independent Set and Budgeted Max Weighted k-D-Matching.
(iii) for any k ≥ 3, a randomized (2k − 1)-approximation mechanism and a deterministic 2k-
approximation mechanism for Budgeted Max Weighted k-D-Matching that run in polynomial
time.
Remark 4.14. Max Weighted Independent Set and Max Weighted k-D-Matching are not submod-
ular, as was the case for Max Weighted Matching. Max Weighted Matroid Member (and thus Max
Weighted Forest), on the other hand, is submodular and therefore the results of [9] apply. How-
ever, our approach significantly improves both the approximation ratio and the running time.
Remark 4.15. Naturally, Remark 4.9 applies here as well. For every problem stated in this section
there is no deterministic (resp. randomized) truthful, budget feasible mechanism with better
approximation ratio than 1+p2 (resp. 2). These lower bounds are independent of any complexity
assumption.
5 Conclusions
We have studied further the problem of designing truthful and budget feasible mechanisms for
budgeted versions of well known optimization problems. Especially for the XOS problems we
considered, only randomized mechanisms with very high approximation ratios were known prior
to our result. There are still many interesting open problems that are worth further exploration
in the context of budgeted mechanism design. First, for the case of submodular functions, even
though we do have a better understanding for designing mechanisms given all the previous
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works, the current results are still not known to be tight. We also want to stress that the literature
has mostly considered nondecreasing submodular functions. Dobzinski et al. [12] gave a con-
stant approximation mechanism for the Budgeted Max Cut problem, however it remains a very
interesting problem for future work to obtain mechanisms for general non-monotone submod-
ular valuations. Furthermore, for the XOS class, the picture is way more challenging. We would
like to identify more problems that admit better approximation guarantees, even with exponen-
tial time mechanisms. A component that seems to be missing at the moment is a characterization
of truthful and budget feasible mechanisms. We believe that obtaining characterization results
would be crucial in resolving the above questions.
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